We introduce a computational framework for understanding the structure and dynamics of moral learning, with a focus on how people learn to trade off the interests and welfare of different individuals in their social groups and the larger society. We posit a minimal set of cognitive capacities that together can solve this learning problem: (1) an abstract and recursive utility calculus to quantitatively represent welfare trade-offs; (2) hierarchical Bayesian inference to understand the actions and judgments of others; and (3) meta-values for learning by value alignment both externally to the values of others and internally to make moral theories consistent with one's own attachments and feelings. Our model explains how children can build from sparse noisy observations of how a small set of individuals make moral decisions to a broad moral competence, able to support an infinite range of judgments and decisions that generalizes even to people they have never met and situations they have not been in or observed. It also provides insight into the causes and dynamics of moral change across time, including cases when moral change can be rapidly progressive, changing values significantly in just a few generations, and cases when it is likely to move more slowly.
Introduction
Common sense suggests that each of us should live his own life (autonomy), give special consideration to certain others (obligation), have some significant concern for the general good (neutral values), and treat the people he deals with decently (deontology). It also suggests that these aims may produce serious inner conflict. Common sense doesn't have the last word in ethics or anywhere else, but it has, as J. L. Austin said about ordinary language, the first word: it should be examined before it is discarded. -Thomas Nagel (1989), The View From Nowhere Basic to any commonsense notion of human morality is a system of values for trading off the interests and welfare of different people. The complexities of social living confront us with the need to make these trade-offs every day: between our own interests and those of others, between our friends, family or group members versus the larger society, people we know who have been good to us or good to others, and people we have never met before or never will meet. Morality demands some consideration for the welfare of people we dislike, and even in some cases for our sworn enemies. Complex moral concepts such as altruism, fairness, loyalty, justice, virtue and obligation have their roots in these tradeoffs, and children are sensitive to them in some form from an early age. Our goal in this paper is to provide a computational framework for understanding how people might learn to make these trade-offs in their decisions and judgments, and the implications of possible learning mechanisms for the dynamics of how a society's collective morality might change over time.
Although some aspects of morality may be innate, and all learning depends in some form on innate structures and mechanisms, there must be a substantial role for learning from experience in how human beings come to see trade-offs among agents' potentially conflicting interests (Mikhail, 2007 (Mikhail, , 2011 . Societies in different places and eras have differed significantly in how they judge these trade-offs should be made (Blake et al., 2015; Henrich et al., 2001; House et al., 2013) . For example, while some societies view preferential treatment of kin as a kind of corruption (nepotism), others view it as a moral obligation (what kind of monster hires a stranger instead of his own brother?). Similarly, some cultures emphasize equal obligations to all human beings, while others focus on special obligations to one's own group e.g. nation, ethnic group, etc. Even within societies, different groups, different families, and different individuals may have different standards (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009 
